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THE ROLE OF RELIGIONS AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
IN THE WARS IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA 1991-1999

Dr. Mitja Velikonja with
Željko Mardešić (alias Jakov Jukić), Paul Mojzes, Radmila Radić and Esad Zgodić
Dr. Mitja Velikonja is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of
Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. He has
published articles previously in REE. This series of written
interviews with his introduction was published in Balcanis , Vol.
2, No. 2, (2002), pp. 68-83 in the Slovenian language, while the
original responses were written in the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian
languages.

More than twelve years have passed since the beginning of the dramatic events in exYugoslavia. Although the memories of these tragic processes are still very alive, it is
today possible to observe them with much less burden than some years ago. Lately, social
sciences offered much more complete and complex images than some years ago, which
more accurately answer the questions of the causes, course, results, and consequences of
the wars. Undoubtedly one of the most important dimensions of these events was religion
in close connections with political, national and military ambitions and goals of certain
groups, parties, and countries.
In a search for answers as to why and how this happened, who were the protagonists,
and what were their interests, it seemed to me intriguing to pose seven questions to four
experts who during the wars promptly and critically wrote about these issues. Their
names – as well as their responses to my questions – follow in alphabetical order.
1. Dr. Željko Mardešić (pseudonym Jakov Jukić) from Split, author of the studies
Budućnost religije: sveto u vremenu svjetovnosti [The Future of Religion: The Holy
in a Time of Secularity] (1991), Lica i maske svetog: ogledi iz društvene religiologije
[Faces and Masks of the Holy: Explorations in Social Religiology](1997) and
Povratak svetog: rasprava o pučkoj religiji [The Return of the Holy: Discussion
about Public Theology] (1998). Among other texts, he contributed to the anthologies
"Konfesije i rat" [Confessions and War](1995) and "Međureligijski dijalog u Europi:
izazovi za kršćane i muslimane u Republici Hrvatskoj i BiH" [ Interreligious
Dialogue in Europe: Challenge for Christians and Muslims in the Republic of Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina](2000).

2. Prof. Dr. Paul Mojzes, professor of religious studies and former Academic Dean and
Provost of Rosemont College near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania is aYugoslavian born
American expert on religious changes in eastern and central Europe. Among others,
he is the author of the studies Church and State in Postwar Eastern Europe (1987),
Religious Liberty in Eastern Europe and the USSR: Before and After the Great
Transformation (1992) and Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the
Balkans (1994). He was the editor of the anthology Religion and the War in Bosnia
(1998).
3. Dr. Radmila Radić, Serbian historian, researcher in the “Institute for Modern Serbian
History” in Belgrade, author of the book Verom protiv vere: Država i verske
zajednice u Srbiji 1945-1953 [Faith Against Faith: The state and religious
communities in Serbia 1945-1953] and – among others – chapters in the anthologies
Srpska strana rata. Trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju [Serbian View of the
War: Trauma and Catharsis in Historical Memory] (1996), "Religion and the War in
Bosnia" (1998) and "Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara 2" [Dialogue of historians
2](2000);
4. Prof. Dr. Esad Zgodić, Boshniak political scientist, lectures at the Sarajevo
Univertsity School of Social Sciences, is the author of the studies "Građanska Bosna"
[Civic Bosnia],(1996), "Kult suvereniteta" [Cult of Sovereignty] (1997), "Studije o
politici" [Political Studies] (1997), "Država, nacija, demokratija" [State, Nation, and
Democracy] (1998), "Bošnjačko iskustvo politike" [Bosnian Experience of
Politics](1998) and "Ideologija nacionalnog mesijanstva” [The Ideology of National
Messianism] (1999).
I followed their opinions, analyses and polemics about these events during and about
this time by reading their books and texts, but also by means of personal contacts with all
four of them. With this short inquiry, accomplished in the summer of 2001, I tried to
present their views to the broader scholarly public in a very concrete, direct way. It was
completely clear to me that these questions are extremely complex and that any of them
would deserve an entire study. But yet, I asked them – for the sake of easier and more
efficient comparison of their opinions – for short answers which would include only the
most important features, phenomena, comparisons and eventually some examples. Their
answers to my questions – which vary in their extent and style – are arranged in
alphabetical order throughout this text. I deliberately did not draw any of my own
conclusions or summary to this tetralogue, because my intention was to leave all the
interpretations to the authors.
This tetralogue was first published under the title “Verstva in zverstva: Vloga religij
in religijskih skupnosti v vojnah na tleh nekdanje Jugoslavije 1991-1999” [Beliefs and
Bestialities: The Role of Religion and Religious Communities in the Wars on the

Territory of Former Yugoslavia, 1991-1999] in the Slovenian language in the journal
“Bal Canis”, Ljubljana-Belgrade, 2002, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 68-83. It is available also in
Serbian/Croatian/Bosniak

language

on

the

web-page

http://www.balcanis.com/revija/stevilka2/shb/8.htm . I am thankful to the four authors for
their kind cooperation.

Question:
What are your views about religious tradition in the Balkans? What are its main
characteristics?
Mardešić:
If we look back into the past, it seems that the long process of deconstruction of
medieval feudalism and creating conditions for development of civil society in all of
Europe is coming to an end. Therefore, we can say that the Balkans was, at least we hope
so, the last refuge and buttress of pre-modernity. By saying that, I don’t mean that there
were no brief penetrations and visits of civil ideas and positions in the Balkans in the last
century. To the contrary, there were a lot of those experiences during periods of stability.
However, those ideas and opinions did not develop gradually as a result of internal
development, but through external influences, and that is why they remained at the level
of barren ideology. Moreover, it is important to stress that political freedom of the
individual as the inalienable essence of modernity was never present in all components of
civil society in the Balkans. That was surely fateful and tragic for the people who lived
there. Neither religious tradition, nor monarchist rule nor communist ideology allowed
modernism to take roots. The process of modernism had been blocked until the most
recent bloody conflict in the region. That is the first characteristic of religion in the
Balkans.
The second characteristic is related to the influence of faith and is linked to the
reasons described above for the lack of political freedom. Wherever there is no political
freedom issues of nationality are being solved by religion. The best example is
Macedonia where the church has been, for centuries, the only guardian of national
consciousness. Everything else was hidden or erased. Therefore, compared to other
western societies, there is a different path to national liberation in the Balkans. While in

most European countries,

civil society was responsible for promotion of national

freedom, in the Balkans, that role was taken by premodern religious communities and
churches in the Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and later in the Muslim part of the Balkans.
For Eastern Orthodoxy, that was not surprising since it is nationalist in its nature and
orientation. It is surprising, however, for Catholicism, which is explicitly universal and
supra-national not only in its core and teaching, but also historically. It was created in this
special way during the Middle Ages within the Austro – Hungarian Monarchy where
religion was often linked to different nations. Therefore Catholicism sometimes plays the
role of universal religion but in other cases the role of a national religion. This shows to
what degree religion is functionally adaptable to the demands of the time and place in
which it exists. That is the means by which it departs from its own holy beginnings.
I would also like to point out that since Christianity, as any other religion, is a
precisely defined and closed worldview, we cannot solve national problems with its help.
That is possible only by politics which is the art of rational negotiation and pragmatic
discussion, and that is why politics is in complete opposition to any worldview that does
not condone changes. In distinction from politics for them there cannot and must not be
concessions. Therefore disputes are mostly solved by the defeat or victory of one of the
confronting forces, but never by agreement. There is no other solution. People in the
Balkans, despite strong ties to religious tradition, have been trying for centuries to get to
national freedom through severe and exclusivist conflict of worldview espoused by
different religions. The same was the case with socialism, which was also shaped as a
worldview and continued with the same inefficiency. That is the reason why
confrontational religions and later ideological communism were not able to do anything
regarding the arrangement and reconciliation of national contradictions. That can be done
only by political modernism. And because it did not exist in the Balkans, its role was
taken by religion with bad and unsuccessful results. That is why, until the fall of the
Berlin Wall, we remained social prisoners of the unhappy fate of premodernity which
was forced to live and exist alongside modernity and postmodernity.
Mojzes:

My answers to the question are applicable to the Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and
Muslim religion and not the Jewish and Protestant. Generally speaking, religion in the
Balkans is collectivist, traditional, hierarchical/priestly and protective.
By collectivist, I mean that the main relationship is not of the individual with
God but the collective [in some cases regarded as “the people of God”] with God. The
role of the individual is small compared to the interest of the whole religious community
(I use this phrase since the word “church” does not apply to Islam.)
The reason for the term “traditional” is that these three religious communities
underwent minimal or no reformation. All three communities have a doctrine that
obligates them to take early periods of their history not only as source of inspiration, but
as also doctrinally and canonically mandatory for their followers. All three religious
communities consider that God’s will was received in the early centuries and that they are
being protected by God from making errors regarding that revelation. Therefore, the best
is to follow tradition since new ideas can lead away from the right path.
At first it may seem that the third characteristic, the hierarchical/priestly, is not
relevant to Islam, but when approached from the functional point of view, I think that all
three religious traditions have leaders who speak authoritatively in the name of all
followers. This characteristic was emphasized even more by the fact that most followers
were not highly educated and did not have deep knowledge of their theology and
religious (canon) law and therefore a small group of leaders had to take that role. Under
priestly, I mean the situation in which the goal of religious leaders is the maintenance of
their institution and not the prophetic role of self- criticism.
Promotion of institutional interests leads to the last characteristic, namely
protective. The task of religious leaders from the top to the bottom is to play the role of
pastor or shepherd who alertly takes care of the welfare of the flock.

They are

responsible for the flock’s survival. This is even more prominent in times of crisis, when
the flock is endangered by “wolves”. Among “wolves” are, of course, rival religious
communities. Therefore, when one religious community was trying to limit the influence
of the other or even convert or proselytize, religious leaders became key protectors of
their religion, which typically overlapped the boundaries of the nation. That led to
circling of the compound with the intent to make the flock homogenous and obedient.

Since the Balkans is in a permanently critical condition, the idea of danger from others is
very present in the minds of people as well as leaders.
Radić:
Religious tradition in the Balkans is characterized by constant tensions and
mistrust between the main religious communities, especially the Roman Catholic and
Serbian Orthodox Church. When there was an attempt to bring together in the 19th
century these religious communities by joining into one state it actually seems as if the
process of distancing started at the same time. The historical foundation for the last
struggle for uniting the Yugoslav peoples was the aspiration to form a single ethnic
community. The basis for that belief was the same as the one that began at the end of the
18th century according to which it is a common language that makes a nation and that
the Yugoslavian territory was made such an entity in Europe. The role of religion was
overlooked and there was an assumption that secularization was deeply rooted in the
society and that it will proceed. The promoters of Yugoslavism believed that the
Yugoslav idea was in the minds of Serbs and Croats and in minds of other south Slavic
people. Contrary to that belief, it seems that religious identification was strong in most of
the population. Promoters of ethnic unity of Serbs and Croats - Yugoslavs - were
convinced in their historical mission and they did not accept warnings that a centralized
state, which they wanted to create, was threatened by religious and cultural differences,
different historical traditions, and so on.
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes did not accept ethnic differences but
did accept religious differences among Yugoslav people. In the Yugoslav state after
1918, however, there was no significant current which, as Josip Juraj Strossmayer
[Catholic bishop] in an earlier period, would have propagated spiritual unity. Besides
that, the idea of Yugoslavism was actually thinking of uniting Christians, while in regard
to Muslims it was always believed that they will gradually return to their “real national
identity,” Serb or Croat.
Disagreements among religious communities started early, at the time of the
Vidovdan [St. Vitus Day] Constitution [1921], and culminated at the time of the
Concordat Crisis [1929]. In the background was a deep dissatisfaction that both the
Serbian Orthodox Church (hereafter SOC) as well as the Roman Catholic Church

(hereafter RCC) experienced in the newly established state. SOC had the position of a
state church in the Kingdom of Serbia, and the RCC had a similar status in the Hapsburg
Monarchy. From those positions, they were theoretically equal, but neither had the
intention to renounce any rights nor influences it had previously held in society. The
pressure they underwent after the Second World War did not bring them closer together
because of the bloody experience in World War II. The relations between SOC and RCC
were almost frozen until the beginning of the 1960s, when parallel with the temporary
process of rapprochement (meetings of religious leaders, dialogues, visits by students,
etc), more explicit requests began for the revision of the positions held by religious
communities, alog with the first signs of nationalism and new conflicts. The process that
began at that time culminated in the 1990s.
Zgodić:
It is almost mysterious, it is also part of mythology, that the religious
composition, the internal relations between their confessional sub-identities, history and
even trans-history of its rivalries and conflicts are contemporaneous in their intentionality
and implication. Still functioning, mysteriously, are consequences of the epochal schism
of the two churches, Eastern and Western. In historiography, there are cultural and
customary reminiscences that the schism was not only religious but that through history it
produced also geographical, conventional, spiritual, cultural, legal, political and above all
antagonistic mentalities.
However, the history of war crimes on these territories shows that in this regard
there are no differences. Among idolatrous claims and narcissistic nationalist claims
belong the conventional notions of Western-Catholic cultural-civilizational superiority
and Eastern Byzantine-Orthodox barbarism. On the one hand these war crimes range
from Papal-Hungarian crusades in Bosnia to ustasha genocides over Serbs and Jews in
Word War II, to the war crimes on Boshnyaks and culturecide in Bosnia after 1993. On
the other hand, they range from the persecution of heretics in Dushan’s empire to chetnik
genocidal war crimes on Muslims in 1941-1945, to the state-sponsored war crime and
genocide arranged by the Serbian-Montenegrin regime and its paralegal and paramilitary
formations after 1992. In the history of these war crimes a contributing role was played
by the hierarchies of both Churches.

By looking at Serbian authors who analyzed the history of Orthodox Christianity
in the Balkans, it seems that the schism (especially in the Serbian version) resulted in the
fact that Serbian Orthodoxy was never freed from pagan content, in other words, it was
never completely Christianized and emancipated from the pre-Slavic and Slavic
paganism.1 Many Serbian critical intellectuals see in the pagan dimension of Serbian
Orthodoxy the trans-historical source of Orthodox affection for state nationalism, worldly
epic, irrational heroism, mythology, profane cults and ethno-idolatrous legitimation of
genocidal crimes. The worldly, aggressive, ethno-statist character of Orthodoxy is also
derived from this paganism.
But the thesis of the wider implications of the schism, no matter how
controversial, has some productive aspects. In discussions about the Bogumil, Catholic,
and Orthodox character of medieval Bosnia, I presented the unconventional position that
medieval Bosnia was more pagan than Christian, which cannot be proven in detail here.
However, that position challenges and irritates those who offer Croato-centric and Serbocentric pseudo-legitimacy of their hegemonistic aspirations in B&H. I’ll give a couple of
illustrations. The medieval Bosnians--that is how they called themselves rather than Serbs
and Croats--did not accept the Christian sacramentalization of marriage, but practiced it
liberally and paganistically, as a matter of the will, a female-male promise and pledge to
faithfulness. An exampled of Bosnian paganism was their tentative and unstable religious
identification so that conversions from Orthodoxy to Bogumilism or Catholicism were
very common, conventional, mostly motivated by pragmatism, through arranged
marriages, political utilitarianism, war or peace, and other agreements. Secular
pragmatism rather than holiness of the Christian religious identifications were dominant
during those times.

In any case, contemporary historical insight into this region’s

religious history must reflect the relation between pagan and Christian less dogmatically
and without the projections of modern notions about the past.
However, the arrival and expansion of Islam was the major influence upon the
Balkan religious mosaic. There are theses that Islam arrived in this region even before the
Ottoman conquest, but unfortunately they are not at the center of critical reexamination.

1

For an extensive version of Serb elaboration of pagan dimensions see Fuad Saltaga, The Anatomy of
Serbian Destruction, (Sarajevo, 1995).

The discussion about whether Islam expanded voluntarily in the region of current B&H
or with the aid of force continues. Those who are anti-Islamic and especially the Serbianoriented insist on the predominance of oppression as the reason for Islamic expansion.
Those who are pro-Ottoman or Turkophile, with idyllic orientation toward the Ottomans
prefer the other explanation, that Islam was accepted voluntarily beginning with the
Qur’anic revelation that faith is impossible under coercion. Those in Bosnia who hold a
critical Ottoman view consider that the expansion of Islam, in different periods of
Ottoman rule in Bosnia, was voluntary but that different forms of coercion were used by
the conquering character of the Ottoman state. When force was not explicit it was
replaced by economical and psychological coercion by the new occupying government.
Most recently, this view has been espoused by the Academician Enver Redzić.
Considering the expansionist character of the Ottoman Turkish state and the
contradictory, non-linear historical processes, he defends the view that the expansion of
Islam in B&H was characterized by moments of external pressure, especially in the first
periods of Ottoman stabilization in Bosnia. In that sense, by accepting and elaborating the
views of Nedim Filipović, who writes, for example, “The direct use of force was replaced
by economic pressure. In fact, the process of Islamization was influenced by the presence
of the real force of the occupying state, and parallel with it’s shadow by tolerance.”2
Independently from these controversies, the religious history was determined by
the following: For the occupied people, Islam was both a reality and metaphor of slavery,
domination, and non-freedom, so that the anti-Ottoman defensive wars were experienced
in the conscience of the masses as wars against Islam rather than as wars for
emancipation from the rule of the occupying government. This identification of B&H
Muslims with the Ottoman state authorities determined all of the relations in B&H,
especially after the Austro-Hungarians took over. The result was a policy of Croatization
and Serbization of Muslims or Muslim self-Croatization or self-Serbization in B&H
which certainly caused severe antagonistic conflicts between the religio-nationalist subidentities in B&H. This was reflected in the ideology of aggression on B&H. The
paradigm of this view was stated after the war crime of genocide in Srebrnica by the
Serbian pseudo-general Mladić: “After the rebellion against the dahije [local Turkish
2

Hundred Years of Muslim Politics in Theses and Controversies of the Science of History, 2000., p. 29.

overlords] there came a time to avenge ourselves against the Turks.” The original idea of
emancipation from the Ottoman state was experienced in ethnocentric nationalist and
genocidal notions such as a total anti-Islamic, i.e. anti-Muslim politics and practice.
Norman Cigar showed concisely what was the content of the irrational anti-Islamism for
ideologically legitimizing the genocide against the Boshnyaks in Bosnia.3
These relations of divergence, which were mostly imported into Bosnia, was just
one side of historical reality. Along with it was also the other side, the side of tolerance,
the ethos of “komšiluk” [neighborliness], the ideas and practices of convergence, the
custom of a sense of balance, religious co-existence, and similar. Between Ivo Andrić’s
picture about B&H as a dark villayet and the [picture of an idyllic harmony as the
paradigm of Bosnian tolerance, even during Ottoman rule there were those who offered a
critical, non-disjunctive picture of Bosnia reflected in the works of Boshnyak
intelligentsia of that time, for instance, Mula Mustafa Basheskiya, M. I. Isević, M.
Prozorac, and others. Over the period of several centuries these intellectuals maintained a
critical attitude toward Ottoman rule in Bosnia, containing a spirit of intra-Bosnian
convergence and an apology on behalf of the socially inferior Boshnyaks, Catholics, and
Orthodox.4
In Bosnian cultural-religious and ethnic polyphony one can see from these
pictures that politics has simply transformed the religious sentiment into an energy or the
simple matter of worldly conflicts. One should recognize that the Catholic Church up to
Vatican II preached an anti-Islamic view with the conviction that Islam cannot be a
revealed religion, and was striving at the same time for Islamic conversions to
Catholicism. The politics of this proselytism is especially well known in Bosnia during
the episcopacy of Josip Štadler. In relation to Islam its interpreters stated, “One should
remember that Štadler in this respect followed the classical theology of his time, and it
spoke about Muhammad and Islam mostly negatively.”5 Topić uses the subtitle of one of

3

Uloga srpskih orijentalista u opravdavanju genocida na Muslimanima Balkana [The Role of Serbian
Orientalists in Defending Genocide over Muslims of the Balkans] (Sarajevo, 2000).
4
About this see more in Esad Zgodić, Bošnjačko iskustvo politike, osmansko doba [Boshnyak experience
of politics in Ottoman Times], (Sarajevo, 1999)
5
Franjo Topić, “Štadler i politika, predavanje odrzano na znanstvenom skupu u Zagrebu u organizaciji
Katolićkog bogoslovnog fakulteta i Družbe sestara Služavki Malog Isusa, Novembar 12, 1998”. in Josip
Štadler, Život i djelo (Sarajevo: Katolička teologija, 1999), p. 288.

his works on theology, to claim that “Muhammedan Faith Cannot be God’s Revelation.”6
The goal of such views was “. . . to prove that only the Christian faith is of divine
origin.”7 Therefore, he represented contemporary “Catholic integrism.”8 “Nowadays we
frequently forget that the theology of that time looked at other religions, including Islam,
differently from today. The Second Vatican Council introduced into theology and then
into Catholic practice a friendly and dialogical position toward other religions. Earlier
they looked exclusively from the viewpoint that Catholicism is the true faith and the
others are wrong.”9 But, regardless of these explanations, it is clear that the Vatican with
its dogmatics, during one period of Bosnian-Herzegovinian history was the source of
inter-religious antagonisms that were then reflected in the secular sphere. In the
reconstruction of the history of the religious reality on these territories, which, of course,
I do not aim to do here, one should start in my view, from the theoretical and conceptual
position which differentiates the historical from dogmatic Christianity and the historical
from revealed Islam. This differentiation leads to differentiation of concrete historical
communities from their original theological identities. History of religion is not identical
to the historical religious communities, which one can illustrate from the example of
Russian Orthodoxy as viewed by Nicholas Berdyaev.10

Question:
What, in your opinion, was the religious dimension of the last fifteen dramatic years in
the former Yugoslavia? In other words, how much was the religious factor involved?
Mardešić:
In the former Yugoslavia, five years after the fall of the socialist system, the
religions, although very present in society, did not have any significant political
influence. How did this happen? Right after WWII, the Communists openly persecuted
religious communities, but did not succeed in acquiring the central role in regard to the
national aspirations of common people. They did quite the opposite. They brought the
nationalist and religious closer together. This period in the former Yugoslavia lasted for
6

Ibid.
Ibid.
8
Franjo Topić, “Štadler i muslimani” in Jopis Šhtadler: Život i djelo, p. 376.
9
Ibid.
10
Ruska ideja [Russian Idea] (Belgrade, 1987).
7

about twenty years. The increase in the standard of living, opening of borders, joining
with and leading the countries of the Third World, as well as the availability of Western
culture later played its role. The social system lost a lot of its seriousness and ideological
severity. Systematically and permanently, the Communists prevented only political
freedom. Even though they tried to replace it [political freedom] they substituted it by
economic self-management. The hatred toward the church and religious communities
ended, and they even established a rich dialogue that may be found in many, today
completely forgotten books.
Mojzes:
The role of religion in the dramatic events at the end of the 20th century in the
Balkans is very controversial. Some argue that they were religious wars, and others
believe that religion played no role at all. I think that religion played an important but not
crucial role. In any case we cannot compare them with crusades nor with jihad. In most
cases I see political manipulation of religious factors and considerably less conscious
religious initiative that led to deteriorating relations. The thesis I developed in the article
“Camouflaged Role of Religion in the War in B&H” was based on my assessment of the
characteristics of religion in the Balkans. Religion in the Balkans is pre-Enlightenment.
This means that religion is not a separate form of theory and practice which influences
other human activities, but that the religion is an inseparable part of human consciousness
which permeates human identity, including nationality. Therefore, when conflict arises
between different nationalities, (especially when nationalism rises to the level of national
chauvinism) and those nationalities are similar to each other, then religious differences
play the role of the separator (therefore in the Albanian-Slavic conflicts religion plays a
minor role whereas in B&H it’s role was much larger).
Radić:
Although some authors think that the religious factor was one of the key elements
of Yugoslav disintegration,11 most researchers whose subject was the role of religion in
the recent conflicts in the Balkans, consider that it was not of primary importance. They
think that the religious communities were manipulated at the time of the fall of
Communism by former communists turned nationalists. The religious conflicts,
11

Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, (London, Penguin, 1993).

according to them, served primarily as substitutes for the national ones. The conflict
therefore arose as a result of the failure of the Yugoslav idea for which many factors,
such as cultural, political, and economic, were more important than religious (Gerard F.
Powers, Paul Mojzes, Xavier Bougarel, Mitja Velikonja, et.). I completely agree with
their opinion, but think that time needs to pass to arrive at the right answer. I don’t think
that the picture we have now will change entirely, but some details will need correction.
As a historian, I think that we need to wait for some other sources to come forward to
show what really was the role of the religious factor. We drew our conclusions by
following the situation from the distance. The one thing that showed clearly is how fatal
was the connection of religion and ethnos in the Balkan region not only in the case of the
Serbian Orthodox community, but also, paradoxically, in the Catholic and Muslim
communities.
The disintegration of Yugoslavia may be considered a result of the unsuccessful
creation of a multicultural community that had a chance to integrate constitutive nations
of different historical and cultural heritage. The nationalistic and separatist euphoria by
which the republic and political oligarchy with the help of external factors destroyed the
second Yugoslavia, took over all leading Yugoslav religious communities with its radical
requests for national and ethnic homogenization. The identification of religion and nation
cannot make peace with the universal religious principles and the need for church to
remain a supra-national institution. Yugoslavia as a multiethnic and multinational state
was especially sensitive to every attempt of identification between church and nation, but
this process of identification was, indeed, a constant occurrence in the history of the
Yugoslav state. As a result of specific Yugoslav religious pluralism, none of the religious
communities could establish a dominant position in Yugoslavia. Therefore, they turned to
“their” nations within which they expected to hold the dominant position and, most often,
it ended in nationalism.
Religion in Yugoslavia never presented itself as a cohesive factor, but the fight of
the church for national and cultural identity turned into intolerance and even open enmity.
That was especially noticeable during the decomposition of Yugoslavia.
Zgodić:

I don’t see any cause-and effect connection, as apparently perceived by one part
of the public opinion, of how on the ground of post-socialism an earnest “return to
religious identity” among the people of ex-Yugoslavia and “the emergence of
intolerance,” and especially of the aggression upon B&H could take place. That
aggression par excellence is an extra-religious manifestation, namely that it is eminently
the result of politics. True, the actors of aggression on Bihać skillfully used religiosity but
they did it in order to foster an “energy” of manipulating the consciousness, petrifying
the xenophobia, and extending ethnic distancing. The aggression on B&H should be
viewed as an act of state politics sui generis. But we should always distinguish authentic
religiosity, as it is presented in the holy sources of religion, from religious communities
as social institutions. As stated above, we distinguish original Islam, original Orthodoxy,
original Catholicism from historical Islam, historical Orthodoxy, and historical
Catholicism. This difference can undoubtedly be seen in the different behavior of
religious communities during the aggression on B&H.

Taking into account this

difference and by the logic of polydeterminism it is useful to think about and explain the
events during the last decade of the 20the Century in ex-Yugoslavia.

Question:
What is, in your opinion, the relationship between religious communities/churches and
the main political orientations/parties, indeed between religion and politics?
Mardešić:
From all I wrote earlier it follows that from a sociological perspective for me
there is ideological politics or politics as ideology that is the first and unbridgeable barrier
to establishing truthful or non-ideological politics in the former Yugoslavia, regardless
whether it is of religious or communist heredity. We always deal with distorted politics-irrational, emotional, unreasonable, fanatic, exclusive, closed, extremist, suspicious-which tends to constantly cause conflicts and long bloody wars. The one, who changes
his ideology even a little bit, loses it. After the break up of the former Yugoslavia, and the
creation of new states, most politicians came from one of two circles: religious and
communist, which is the worst possible case. No part of society (neither the economy, art,
science, law, nor the family) was so much inoculated with ideology as was politics.

Politics should have developed into a healthy political life without any stiffness and
claims to infallibility. Therefore all our post-war political parties had the specific mark of
ideological seriousness and ideological inflexibility instead of political shrewdness and
laid-back negotiations. It turns out that this unbearable seriousness of politics of a certain
type of human metaphysics, was its greatest negation. Ideology and politics are actually
extremely different. Nobody was greatly surprised by the fact that all the larger new
political parties resembled mass political movements or collectivistic religious meetings
more than they resembled modern political organizations. The most surprising for the
uninformed was that idyllic and enthusiastic cooperation of former communists with the
religious elite within certain parties by which they unintentionally combined the stiffness
of both these world ideologies. In Croatia, Tudjman’s HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union]
was certainly such an example and not surprisingly it completely destroyed the remnants
of healthy politics within itself and its vicinity. In that way nationalism became the only
important ideology. Nevertheless, those big parties, some earlier and some later,
experienced an expected crisis since they did not exercise real politics. They lived solely
from ideological inspiration and enthusiasm. Those who played a double ideological
game, hiding interest behind noble political rhetoric were obsessively getting rich, hidden
from the public eye. Not many things were put on the agenda since the social mechanism
remained undemocratic and autocratic. What else could be expected from people who
had lead politics to become a fateful defense of the greatness of their ideology. Therefore,
they hid everything dishonest since they were afraid to get dirty. New parties that came to
power later faced a double task of secularizing politics from ideological weaknesses and
cleaning-up abuse. The situation is such that it is surely not going to be easy and painless,
since it is a pretty tough heritage.
Mojzes:
While the Communist Party had an aversion towards religion during
Communism, in the post-communist era some parties stayed secular while others
searched for closer relations with the main religious community. The more nationalist the
party, the greater its desire to get close to the religious community. The politicians such
as Tudjman, Izetbegović, and Karadžić used photo-opportunities to attract believers to
support their political solution. It was interesting to see pictures of the Parliament of the

Republika Srpska [Bosnian Serb Republic] where priests sit in the front row. Karadžić
claimed that he consulted God and religious leaders for everything he did. However, I
don’t believe him. He listened to neither God nor bishops.
Radić:
From the perspective of my professional interest I think it is still too early to
correctly answer this question. The research shows close ties of religion and politics in
both the First and in Second Yugoslavia. The relation between politics and religion went
through different phases and was different in many ways in separate parts of various
religious communities. If we talk about the time after WWII, we have to take into
account that the relation of religious communities with state authorities greatly depended
on their power, historical heritage, financial strength, etc. Some religious communities
such as SOC or the Islamic Religious Community were, after the initial period of state
pressure (1945-1954), basically kept under control and they cooperated without much
resistance with the state, although they always opposed it internally, acting in secrecy.
RCC had more opportunities to give stronger opposition and that opposition often created
great concern among government leaders. There were some differences in the way RCC
acted in the fifties and later. Also the RCC acted differently in Croatia than in Slovenia or
Macedonia. At the beginning of the sixties, with the sudden increase in the number of
religious publications, massive religious meetings, and the number of churches being
built, the religious communities became more present in daily life, and their demands
were more open and extensive. At that time, the government still held control over
religious communities by different means (e.g. the selection of high religious officials,
certain decisions at religious conferences, etc.). This control took place in different ways.
During the eighties there was a more noticeable closeness of republican, federal, and
party structures to certain groups within religious communities. It is early to talk about
what really happened internally, but it seems to me that the religious communities turned
toward those whom they considered able to meet their requests, some of which were not
specifically religious.
Zgodić:
I think that the religious identification among Boshnyaks, Bosnian Croats, and
Bosnian Serbs are stable and unquestionable, and there is nothing dangerous about it.

There is no religious community which expands its membership by conversions and that
does not represent any danger, so that voluntary conversions to Islam in Europe is not
scandalous; there is even talk about a new phenomenon of Euroislam. On the other hand,
everything else is in upheaval in terms of movement and uncertainty. On the other hand
no one in Europe’s West is upset about the symbiotic relationship between political
parties and religions. Only in our historical context is it upsetting, irritating, scandalous,
creating panic, excited polemics, and controversial reflections about the actual
relationship between certain ruling national parties and religious communities.
What is actually the issue? Are we not still prisoners, even unconsciously, of
anachronistic pseudo-socialist conceptions about the relationship between the state,
society, and religion? Or is it that in practice there are so many anomalies, antinomies,
anachronisms, pathological deformations, that a rightly oriented thinker must more
decisively begin with the demystification of the above-mentioned deformities? Firstly,
we don’t see anything problematic with some of the political parties in B&H that take the
dogmas of Islam, Orthodoxy, or Catholicism as essential or as one of the more important
dimensions of their moral-political identity. That is the right that emanates from a
pluralistic essence of democracy.
Problems begin when out of such dogmatics one wants to project governmental
and political programs, namely, when from the sphere of ethics one wants to go into the
secular world of society and state. Of course, no one dares to openly and explicitly show
up with a constitutional-legal project based on theocratic principles.

In practice,

however, one can foresee certain elements of a theocratization of the state’s domain at
least in its symbolically manifested expressions. Installation of religious content into state
festivals, and festive obligations or vows, the religious sacralization of military and
political personalities from national histories, or the current ritual dedication of state or
military objects and even places where war crimes and genocides were carried out, the
popular deification of state holidays, the integration of religious elites into secular or
governmental rituals, curiously non-transparent, are actually informal and thereby a
poorly discernible symbiosis of religious and state-party power. All of these are
expressions of a certain form of theocratization of the state domain, each of which
deserves a critical analysis. Although one should not exaggerate the strength of these

manifestations, they nevertheless signify that some of the national parties base their
relationship toward religion on politics, which is different from the Western European
practice of preserving the secularism of the state.
But the theocratization of the state does not have a realistic chance because in
B&H it is impossible to promote any one of the religions into the official religion and
then proclaim its dogmas as the basis of the state ideology or its legal structure.
Therefore it is impossible to even think that B&H could be based on the promotion of the
shari’a or Christian canon law as the source and basis of the Bosnian legal system,
because in that case the state would be destroyed from within due to the expected and
understandable rebellion and subversion by the other, non-official religions.
Here I speak from the perspective of a Bosnian integrist. Of course, from the
perspective of those political powers which would completely destroy B&H as a state or
want to reconstruct it as a pseudo-state community of three separate and hence a
discriminatory system of religiously established national mini-states, things look entirely
different.

Question:
What was in your opinion the role of religious communities/churches and religious
hierarchies in the promotion of nationalistic and chauvinistic demonstrations and actions
which consequently lead to wars?
Mardešić:
The opinions are very different and contradictory. I have already addressed some
of this and don’t want to repeat myself. I think we have to be careful not to oversimplify
things. There are always several factors in play. There are no signs that churches and
religious communities are doing something different in recent times from what they did
through their long history. For those who know history it is nothing new. It could be that
the circumstances were worse and that therefore one had to respond with the help of
strengthened action but always from the same starting points. In pre-modern times that
was the customary position of the churches and religious communities. Unifying
reactions and functions of religion are not only the matter of human striving - don’t mind

my use of this expression - but also the biological base of any socialization. It exists and
should be taken into consideration.
Mojzes:
The members of all three hierarchies contributed in certain ways to the inciting of
nationalistic feelings. Sending students to very conservative Islamic countries contributed
to the identification of Boshnyak people (who were at that time called “Muslims”) with
Islam and to their increased identification with the Islamic world (especially the more
militant one). This increased the fear of Christians that more significant changes will
affect the status quo and perhaps return to the shari’ate law and other restrictions which
would become mandatory for all.
The Orthodox hierarchs were gradually gaining independence from the
domination by the Yugoslav regime and identified closer with the Serbian government
specially over the issue of Kosovo. They were leaders in opposing anything that they
considered to be a threat of Albanian domination in Kosovo. This was accompanied with
the awakening of memories of being victims of the ustashas during WWII. As Croats
and Slovenes (Catholics) distanced themselves from Yugoslavia, the more the Serbian
hierarchy became afraid of repeated persecutions of Orthodox Christians, not to mention
their concern over the likely break-up of the territory populated by Serbs into several
states. That would have difficult consequences in regard to the question of the diocesan
jurisdictional system of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
Catholic bishops regarded the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) not only as a
party that represents Croat interests, but as an all-Croat anticommunist movement that
would provide much more freedom to the Catholic Church among Croats. By supporting
the independence of Croatia and by creating a Croat political party in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Franjo Kuharić and other bishops de facto supported the option which was
leading toward the break up of Yugoslavia. By being against the official use of the
Serbian language, and by supporting Croatian language as the only official language of
the Republic of Croatia, as well as being reluctant to apologize for the abuses by the
Catholic Church in the Independent State of Croatia during WWII, the Catholic Church
gave signals to Serbs that they are endangered if they stay unprotected in Croatian areas.
Radić:

We can not talk about religious communities as a compact entity. Every
community had representatives who thought differently, but during certain time periods a
more radical trend dominated, often affecting the behavior of others. All religious
communities had representatives who promoted inflammatory nationalistic and
chauvinistic positions and actions, but I think one should take into account the possibility
of their influence which was not always the same. Up until now no comparative analysis
was made of the influence of various religious communities in the area of former
Yugoslavia, but only such an analysis would truly show what really happened and who
was to what extent responsible for the actions of the religious communities. The main
focus was on the activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church that was often blamed as the
main guilty party, which I don’t think is true. At the beginning of the 1980s, as the result
of the Kosovo crisis and the general crisis of society, the anti-western wing in the SOC
started getting stronger, showing undisguised support for monarchism, anti-westernism,
and a denial of the achievements of the modern world. Priests and part of the episcopate
were nationally and patriotically oriented, though more and more in terms of medieval
and isolationistic categories.

Concepts such as democracy, liberalism, freedom of

conscience, and western culture were simply treated as negative and anti-Orthodox.
It was more and more obvious that the Church not only wanted to free itself from
tutorship by the state, but also to obtain some indirect role in the guidance of society, and
eventually the role of the dominant state religion. Increasingly present were theses about
the need to reorganize the Yugoslav state in a manner that was most advantageous to
Serb national interests and the interests of SOC. The open support of the Vatican to the
secession of some Yugoslav republics was received as proof of the thesis of a “Vatican
Conspiracy” against Serbs and also against the Yugoslav state. Some recent research,
(e.g. that of Vjekoslav Perić), shows that the RCC did play a very important role in the
preparation for the conflict, but in distinction from SOC it did it more cautiously, without
direct and public advocacy by the highest hierarchy. Concerning the Islamic Religious
Community, one should pay attention to the works of Xavier Bougarel who covers the
internal genesis of relations in this religious community and about their phases during the
most recent years.
Zgodić:

There is no basis for a unifying view. But it is interesting that one can discern
their role out of the traditional relationship of religious communities toward the ruling
and even aggressive state policies. It is surprising, mystical, unfathomable. Without a
priori apologetics, one must say that since the Boshnyak people were at the center of
Serbian/Montenegrin and later Croat genocidal aggression, it is understandable that the
leaders of the Islamic community involved themselves in the sphere of public politics.
Thereby some of them occasionally became extremist. We are not saying that it was their
only reaction, namely, that they did not have their own original, authentic conceptions.
But it was nevertheless a response to the geopolitical concepts of Milošević and Tudjman
about the creation - in case they could not divide Bosnia and annex its parts - of a Muslim
mini-state that will end up under Europe’s patronage; the messianic task of Croatia
should be to Europeanize the Muslims. It is understandable, on the other hand, that the
defenders of B&H also activated the emancipatory potentialities in the religious identity
of the Boshnyaks. But under conditions of peace, such activation, especially within
Islamic fractions, or in Bosnia the non-traditional mesheba, which work outside the
official Islamic community of B&H, these take on controversial implications into which
we cannot delve here.
Its true, that at the time, the elite of the Boshnyak power acceded to the option of
the internal ethnic division of B&H. But later, under the pressure of the multinational
powers of Bosnia-Herzegovinian integration, they had to give it up. In addition, with the
radicalization of a part of the Islamic establishment also came into play the complex of
prejudices toward Islamic public activity. In that respect what was allowed as the
traditional form of address to the Zagreb or Bosnian Catholic cardinal was inhibited or
proscribed to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian reis. Simply, in the mentalities there was and
still exists a relationship of discrimination, of

a piori aversion, and xenophobic

anathemazation. But naturally one cannot deny the fact that leaders of the Islamic
community, on their part, temporarily by their political statements, assisted in the
artificial production of the view of advancing Islamic fundamentalism, which really, in
our perception, did not have, nor does it have a basis in the mass mentality and historical
aspirations of the Boshnyak people. But on the other hand, each self-apology of
Boshnyaks (there are several relevant studies, mostly by foreign observers and authors)

show, augmenting our Bosnian-Herzegovinian experiences, that SOC directly and
explicitly participated in motivating, legitimizing, and religiously sanctioning SerbianMontenegrin aggression upon B&H.

There are untold number of examples which

demonstrate how the SOC, even with the assistance of other Orthodox Churches,
participated in the destruction of the state individuality of B&H, sacralizing the places of
greatest war crimes, sanctifying fields, buildings, towns, villages, and with their religious
authority legitimated the terrifying crimes thereby supporting the illegitimate pseudolegal installation of Serbian rule on the territory of B&H and its para-military formations.
SOC did, on this or that way, undoubtedly stand behind the wars of conquest which the
Belgrade regime engaged in after 1992 on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia.
It is not simple to uncover the relationship of the Catholic Church in Croatia and
even more so in B&H, with the aggression by Tudjman’s regime toward B&H. This
difficulty is due to the hypocrisy, doubled in public and internal rhetorical discourse:
formally supporting a unified B&H but in reality pleading for a separatist great-Croat
political conception. One can say with certainty that during the aggression, after the
Dayton agreement, and especially after the elections of the year 2000, parts of the
Catholic hierarchy, especially in Herzegovina, participated without disguise in
proliferating and legitimating the politics of the Croatian Democratic Union. Here, we
should especially emphasize this, the Bosnian Franciscans are to be exempt, because
politically and factually they stood in defense of Bosnian statehood, unity, sovereignty,
and ethnical indivisibility.
Regardless of all these controversies and the assistance of religious communities
in the legitimization of the aggression upon B&H from abroad, one can say that basically
the politics on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia is non-religious, secular, state-nationalist,
and hegemonistic aspirations of the neighbor states of B&H. The hierarchies of religious
communities, we have to admit, used the old religious prejudices, ancient religious
dogmas, traditional epic and national mythology, as the energy of instigating the conflict,
even those that had genocidal results. But their participation in aggression was not
authentic: the motives and goals were extra-religious, worldly, state-hegemonistic. That
is, they are reduced to the territorial nationalism of Serbian-Montenegrin and Croatian
establishment which, in the context of the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia, wanted to

achieve old Serbian and Croatian aspirations toward B&H, calling upon the invented
historical, ethnic and state rights to the territory of B&H. One should take into account
that such aspirations have their historical basis, e.g. the theology of the Serbian cultural
circle and chetnik movement of Draža Mihailović, on one hand, and the ideology of the
right of Ante Starčevića, Stjepan Radić, Josip Frank, Maček, and Ante Pavelić and others,
on the other hand.
The artificial character of such aggressive, war-conquering politics was shown
also in the defense of the territorial integrity of B&H, now with the assistance of the
international community. We believe that the logos of the historical existence of B&H,
being concertrated around the ethos of convergence of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian national
sub-identities, will eventually triumph.
Of special importance in this context is the understanding of what we call the
logos of Bosnian history. From this understanding one can deduce historically based
substantial principles of a Bosnian-Herzegovinian future. Among those principle we
include the principles of cohesion, balance, tolerance, equality, and convergence between
Bosnian-Herzegovinian religio-national subidentities. It will exclude the theory or
political doctrine about a leading nation, a nation which would be “the spine of Bosnia,”
a nation which wants to be the single integrative factor of Bosnia, etc. These critiques,
based on valid historical insights into the catastrophic consequences of the domination of
Serbian and Croatian politics in Bosnia, are here related to the contemporary Boshnyac
politics. The Bosnian-Herzegovinian state can historically exist only on the basis of
balance, tolerance, and equal worth of all its peoples. Therefore, Bosnian identity, as we
understand it, is not unificatory, nihilist, and destructive. Therefore we speak of different
but authentic, not imported Bosnian sub-identities. Even now the political mind, which
values B&H as a state individuality, will concentrate its strategic activity upon that which
is threatened, which is also that which is salvatory: the idea of convergence as an idea
which will be the “metaphysical” and real foundation of the reintegration of B&H, both
as a society and as a state. The source for a dynamic ethos and political convergence, for
the establishment of a new balance and process of all inclusive reintegration Bosnia can
be found in the idea of a modern democracy, derived from a civil constitution of Bosnian
society and the building of a pluralistic understanding of a democratic state.

Question:
In the scholarly community we often see simplistic explanations of the conflict in former
Yugoslavia. For some, it was (also) a religious conflict, in which all religious
communities played an active role. For others, it was the consequence of several decades
of “Godlessness”, of the domination by an atheist/secularist ideology. What is your
opinion about it?
Mardešić:
We shouldn’t forget that dualism is of an exclusively ideological character. We
can say today that the war in the former Yugoslavia was not a religious conflict but
political score-settling which was mostly fueled by the memories of evil acts from distant
and recent memories. However, it doesn’t mean that religions—each in its own way and
with a different role--were not deeply and in a complex manner, involved in the tragic
conflict. If for no other reason, at least because they were not loud enough protesting
against hatred which had been fanned prior to the war and during the war, causing the
death of many. If there was abuse of religion - and there was a lot of it - it was necessary
for the religious communities to distance themselves decisively from the misuse of
religion. But, regretfully, that didn’t happen.
It seems there are at least two reasons that support the thesis that the conflict was
of worldly rather than religious character. The first one was the complete absence of
proselytism during the war. In contrast to previous conflicts, which arose mainly for the
purpose of religious conversion, there were no such attempts now. At least I am unaware
of such an example, and even if any happened, we would surely have knowledge of them
by now. The other reason is the realization that wars were not led by religious fanatics,
but by well-organized soldiers. The wars were dominated by indifferent and poorly
educated Christians and Muslims. The situation among the officers was even worse. Ten
years before the war, the psychologist, D. Pantić, studied the presence of religion among
residents of Belgrade and proved their almost total secularism. The results of other
religious studies by other sociologists were not much different. Why would one posit that
such secularized individuals at once start fanatical religious wars and on top of it in a
recently socialist country? I think these conclusions are exaggerated and too quick. Of

course, this does not exclude the possibility of the influence of religious communities on
the inflammation and continuation of nationalist passions in the society before and after
beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia.
The assumption that the cause of the war was solely due to the Communist
heritage is even less likely, since Communists created the strongest state consisting of
various nations. We can rather say the opposite, that it happened because Communists
betrayed and warped the Communist heritage. But even that is not the complete truth. No
matter how we look at the war we will always be confronted with more than one cause. It
is hard to determine correctly which was the most important. It depends on the type of
scholarly discipline and the methodology used. A sociologist, political scientist,
religiologist and historian would select different reasons as the most important ones, in
spite of looking at the same facts. Therefore interdisciplinary science is necessary in
every methodology. It is important to avoid an ideological approach when analyzing
causes of the war since ideology was the most influential factor in the recent happenings.
We need to pay attention to the permanent absence of personal political freedom which is
just another manifestation of ideological pressure. The lack of freedom is also linked to
the transformation of religion to ideology under the mask of ideology itself. There is a
certain unlucky and sickly relationship between freedom and religion that can’t be
overcome without taking responsibility. Even among religions there is a noticeable
movement toward freedom, but that is a topic of postmodernism.
Mojzes:
There is a little bit of truth in both of those simplistic explanations. The
consequences of “atheization” and militant Communist antireligious ideology certainly
played a big role in influencing social opinions that there can be only one real answer.
They also caused the deterioration of religious communities that couldn’t afford to
produce religious leaders who would be able to deal with the changes that took place.
Had the awakening of religion in post-communism taken place within a stable or single
culture environment, the consequences would not have been so fatal (for that reason
Slovenia was in a better situation). But in multinational and multi-confessional
Yugoslavia, which was also under the strong influence of extremist emigrant circles,
religious awakening was linked to the awakening of such a type of nationalism which

was being suppressed by the “international proletarian movement.” Therefore, I think that
it is not an “either-or” but a “both-and” issue, i.e. I see a combination of factors.
Radić:
I think that the war was not a religious conflict, but I also think it was not the
consequence of the long rule of atheist/secularist ideology. The story of a religious
conflict was launched by those who defended the thesis of a “border on the Drina River”
and the irreconcilable differences between a “cultural West” and a “barbarian East.” The
second source emanates from the religious communities themselves which tried to
remove from themselves any vestige of responsibility for participation in the tragic
developments, and simultaneously, on the other hand, to impose the idea of their return,
because “had they been present such a thing would not have happened.” In my opinion, it
was neither a conflict of believers who belonged to different religions nor a conflict
caused by unbelief. It was a conflict about division of the realm and the maintenance of
control.
Zgodić:
Those who speak about a “civil war” or “religious war” in B&H actually want to
give reprieve of responsibility; such as “well, this was a civil war” or even “religious
war” in which, by its own nature, everything is permissible, even all crimes - and in such
a situation there is no responsibility, etc. Of course, this is total nonsense.
The goal of such an answer is to assure amnesty for neighboring countries, i.e.
their regimes, as well as for the inner Bosnian para-legal and paramilitary formations
which were an “internal support” of aggression upon our state. Those who committed the
crime of genocide use this view because they want to depersonalize the responsibility for
the crimes and transfer it upon abstract national collectives. But I expect that the
development of international law will regard that even states, when they are planners and
executors of the crimes of genocide must be held responsible before international courts.
Also I see their “aim” in the annulment of the difference between the victim and
perpetrator, which is, at least in some international circles, a presupposition for internal
all-Bosnia reconciliation. They say, “you fought amongst yourselves, now make up.”
Naturally, all these “aims” reflect the falsification which hurts the victims while
the perpetrators are not given the possibility to emerge out of moral unconsciousness and

experience a catharsis as a precondition to mental healing and prevention of possible
new crimes.

Question: In your opinion, what was more (mis)used: religion of the faith communities in
the service of nationalistic politics and/or parties or the latter in the service of the
religion of faith communities? Which was more evident, the misuse of religion for
nationalist aims or of nationalism for religious purposes?
Mardešić:
Even if we are among those who are most critical toward the standpoints of the
representatives of churches and religious communities it would be difficult to say that
they wanted and desired the wars. That would be absurd. All of us who still remember
well the last years of Communism on the territory of the former Yugoslavia can recall
that the war of words began before the war of weapons, hatred, and bloody human
sacrifices.

In this war before the war many participated thinking that they were

expanding the narrow frame of liberty rather than preparing an actual war. No one
anticipated this because one always believed in the permanence of Communism in the
world. Although nationalism during this period was already an equal rival to
Communism, the destruction of Communism did not appear to be an option. Many used
nationalism in order to settle old scores within Communism itself. Therefore the play of
these two opposing ideologies was quite underestimated. I have already noted earlier that
a war can be started only by those who were in power and had weapons in their hands.
Others could only defend themselves. Religious officials arrived on the scene only later:
each in its own way and by its own traditional path. Differences in behavior did exist
between the religions as well as between believers and officials within the same church
and community. In so far as there was no political liberty, there was surely moral
freedom to choose between good and evil, to sacrifice for others and have hatred toward
others. But sociological analysis cannot deal with this issue.
Mojzes:
I think that the instrumentalization of religious communities had the priority,
because political movements had far more energy and strength. Esad Ćimić wrote a book
entitled, Politika kao sudbina [Politics as Fate] - this seems to me to be a self-evident

truth not only for Bosnia but for the entire Balkans. The slogans were “God protects
Croatia” or “God protects Serbs,” which are more political than religious slogans (a
religious slogan would be something like “Serbs or Croats rely on God and glorify
God.”) Politics was more dynamic and religious communities adapted themselves to
politics. Only later, when they saw how much damage was caused to them by some
political actions did they begin to distance themselves from politics (one of the better
examples was the initial support of the Catholic Church for Herzeg-Bosnia [the name of
the Croatian enclave in Bosnia that proclaimed itself a state during the war]. But seeing
that this may bring about the disappearance of Catholicism in Bosnia proper, they began
to support the idea of an indivisible state of B&H.
Radić:
Yugoslav sociologists of religion have concluded in the beginning of the 1980s
that a revitalization of religion was taking place. The non-existence of opposition in the
previous phase of the development of society attracted to the church all those who
thought differently because in its wings they could find some sort of legal opposition.
The church thereby became the haven for one part of the political and cultural opposition
and offered integrity to a part of the nationally oriented intelligentsia. Within the church,
national continuity was nurtured, and so was the cult of grand national and religious
leaders, of national history in general, and of traditional customs and values. With the
deepening of the general crisis and with the disintegration of the system of values
credibility to the traditional way of solving existential problems returned. Orthodoxy,
Catholicism, and Islam received increasing significance for the cultural characteristics of
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims and for their homogenization and identification toward other
national and confessional attachments. This process did not happen simultaneously
among all, nor under identical conditions, but everywhere the circumstances under which
religion became revitalized was useful to nationalist and other types of instrumentalizers
of the churches. There were many examples of this in SOC as well as RCC, but maybe
the most noticeable are the ones related to individual priests and monks who were
photographed on tanks with weapons, held interviews with children’s skulls in hand, or
made fiery speeches calling for settling of scores with believers of other faiths.
Zgodić:

This question can be reflected in various discourses. Here it is taking place in the
context of the understanding of secularism. Great mistakes and deceptions play a big role
among us, not only in public but also in scholarly circles about the notion of the
secularism of the state. Most often under secularism of the state, is meant among us the
atheism of the state. That is a wrong notion because it proclaims a single worldview, in
this case the atheist one, proclaiming it as the ideology of the state and the foundation of
its constitutional-legal structure. Secularism of the state in the modern world merely
means that the state is permissive toward all ideological systems, whichever
philosophical pictures of the world, whichever worldview, including religious ones are
present. The state, insofar as it is democratic, a state of law and pluralist, is indifferent
toward any picture of the world, and it does not take any of them as the basis of its own
constitutional-legal basis, as a source of its inner-political identification, as the basis of
human rights, etc. Modern states in terms of values are pluralist while in regard to
government pragmatic. Therefore worldview fundamentalism, i.e. an ethos and politics
that subjects an entire society to the absolutism of one truth, whatever it may be, whether
in religion, ideology, or eschatology, is something alien to modern states.
Such a notion of the secularism of the state implies several essential experiences.
It does not imply secularism of society, neither does it imply theocratization of society,
namely theomonocentric disciplining of civil society.

Second, such a notion of state

secularism does not imply the reduction of religion to autarchic private subjectivity but
the opposite. Within the autonomy of civil society, it recognizies its relevance in public
engagement for the general public good and the moral fashioning of citizens. Third,
secularism of that state implies that no one, not even the state or the party, can take upon
itself specific authentic tasks of the church, just as the church cannot be the extended arm
of the party. We are talking about mutual autonomy, so that the party cannot be placed
into the role and function of any religious community as its political extension or
exponent, just as religious communities will not be instrumentalized into the functions of
any political party. Western Europe did not reach an absolute break-up of the relationship
between religion and the state, a fact which is noticeable especially in education, for
instance in catechism classes.

Within such an understanding of secularism one can open a space for identifiying
the use/misuse of the relationship between the political parties and the church. From the
experiences of Bosnia-Herzegovina one can make the following generalization: those
relationships were established on the pattern of parasitical symbiosis. A political party
which in its political identity incorporates religious beliefs, being of a single nation and
single religion, factually perform many tasks for religious communities. Not only do they
popularize with their own authority a religious worldview in public life among their
followers, and among religiously indifferent citizens, but also by means of party-state
policies they directly or indirectly present and implement the corporate interests of
religious communities.
As a result of the symbiosis, the opposite process is also taking place. If in some
cases political parties become the extended arm of religious communities, whereby such
religious communities do not fit into the conceptual frame state secularism and pluralism
of values within civil society, then one can say that religious communities often become
the extended arm of political parties. It is a symbiosis of the parasitical kind. The party,
using the logic of parasitical advantage-taking, calls on the authority of religious
communities, and they selflessly participate in the establishment or restoration of their
might, when it is threatened. Both the religious community and party are losers in such
cases. The party lives with the illusion of its own authority, and delays its own real
renewal or confrontation with its own anachronism. The religious community loses in so
far as it places itself in the function of a political particularity, and thereby loses its
universal potential and wastes its internal energies on profane issues. The political party
living with the appearance of citizen support is pushing society into pseudocratism with
all its anti-democratic consequences.
The parasitical reliance of the party on the authority of the religious community
comes to special expression during the period of elections. Religious structures of power
in elections place themselves at the disposal of political parties, and in the form of
mimicry or even explicitly they function as a medium for the winning over of the
electorate for national, i.e. populist parties.
Further, from this symbiotic relationship political parties, whether they wanted it
or not, came to resolve eminently internal-religious problems, and thereby they take over

tasks which as worldly subject they do not possess. Thereby the autonomy of religious
communities is threatened and their sovereignty in religious matters. In this context the
religious community loses in its authenticity, while the party perversely claims a merit
which inherently does not belong to it.
One of the consequences of these symbiotic relations between parties and
religious communities is the simplification of national identities. The national party
becomes identical with the nation. The religious community identifies itself with the
nation as the entirety of the believing people. A new form of dangerous totalitarianism is
being produced in which the essence of the nation and of faith is being falsified. Political
parties based on religious dogmas agree with religious communities that allow
themselves to be used by political parties in their joint wish to rule a nation. The victim is
the nation; as its victim the nation is suffocated in its natural plurality. The party became
totalitarian, while the religious community became theocratic. All have lost

their

authenticity and their original freedom.

Question:
What can religious communities/churches do for the peaceful development of the
Balkans and for the coexistence of its peoples? What can one expect from them? Which
of their activities and moves so far do you assess as positive?
Mardešić:
First of all a certain exploring of their conscience should take place. If they don’t
respond, they’ll be forced to it by modernity which will penetrate into our territories and
promoted the construction of completely secular states. When such states get established
they will take over the concern about national questions that will then no longer be the
domain of the churches and religious communities as it had been for centuries. That
can’t happen without changing attitudes toward tradition and termination of the alliance
with the state, which will certainly be most difficult to achieve for the SOC, which was
originally founded as a national church. On the other hand, the churches themselves with
the separation of faith from politics can gain in purity, attractiveness, esteem, values, and
persuasiveness. What will remain is the original vocation of the religion, and it is always
and unavoidably peaceful. This is happening slowly in all religions of the world. The

less political they are the more religious they are. The essence of every religion is in
peace and reconciliation with God and with people. Therefore the establishment of a
culture of peace on the territories of the former Yugoslavia depends primarily on the
return of religion to its own sources and the rejection of political aspirations. Religions
must become ideologies and worldviews distinct from politics but not within it, which
means that their aim is for goodness and mercy toward people. In that way the national
will becomes something different, different from what it has been, because it will lose the
dangerous characteristics of ideology, and will turn into common, natural, tranquil
patriotism.
Let me return to Catholicism, since I know it better. With reference to our themes
it is evident that one should distinguish between the pre-Conciliar and Conciliar Church.
The Church, since Constantine onward, was historically built on the model of the state,
which in the long run determined its characteristics.

As the secular state of

Enlightenment and subsequently took over those characteristics – of ideology, law, rule,
and sovereignty - the church started to lose out on further equal cooperation in dealings
with the state. This withering of the old regime continued for centuries until the church
had been irrevocably moved into the realm of society and there got equal rights with
every other voluntary organization. Nowadays the state no longer bargains with the
church, it only guarantees its existence in society. In conversation with the church are
now the people and the state government, definitely an unusual change if we compare it
with the circumstances that existed in pre-modern times. Those who fail to understand
this will waste their time with fantasies.
In Catholic pre-Conciliar circles we can notice this obsession with the state,
which we have failed to overcome in our Church. It is wrong to think if the relationships
with the state are good that everything else will also be good. The opposite is the case.
Too great a faith in the positive intentions and aid from the state is the reason why the
church is impotent and confused in pluralist societies as if negotiating between equal
organizations. In other words, our Church is in a crisis, because it has a hard time to get
used to the fact that it must remain alone with its believers without iron clad state
privileges even though it survived without them under communism.

Because such expectations could not be attained on the basis of experiences which
the church gained under communism, its source should be sought in a pre-Conciliar
mentality which was laced with nostalgia for a church state or an alliance with Catholic
states in the old regime. This pre-Conciliar mentality made it impossible for the church
to rely upon itself and its faithful, instead it hopelessly seeks to return to the past. A preConciliar church mentality is the greatest obstacle to the establishment of political
liberties and simultaneously the reason for the halting of the return to its own peaceful
sources.
Therefore it is urgent and necessary for the Church in Croatian society to reflect
upon its past loyalty to the spirit of the Second Vatican Council and to struggle toward
its appreciation. Only in this way will it be ready and able without conditions and
limitations to intercede for peace and the culture of peace. In short, only the Conciliar
church can be a peaceful church. For this there are good conditions because the Conciliar
documents undoubtedly lead toward the possibility of interpreting politics and nationality
in a modern and contemporary manner, which we also support. It is enough to look at
two texts: “De Libertate Religiosa” on religious freedom and “Gaudium et Spes” from
the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council. In the first document we can find the
acceptance of the right to religious liberty and thereby one inadvertently weakens any
integrational and integrative role of religions in society because its mutual co-existence
and encounter is being presupposed, which means that the role of Catholicism as an
integrative factor is impossible and superfluous. Simultaneously the peaceful role of the
church increases. The second document defends and promotes the autonomy, whereby
politics is also granted autonomy and the possibility of raising it to the level of an
ideology has been rejected. In so far as faith is ideology then politics cannot be. At the
end we can emphasize that the Conciliar understanding of religious liberty and autonomy
actually destroys the former foundation of Christianity as the integrational religion and
ideological omnipresence. Thereby the doors are opened wide to the peaceful activity of
the Church in society.
Mojzes:
It should be the easiest and most extensive question to answer but actually it is
fairly difficult. Religious communities must return, first of all, to the theological center,

to their universal religious claim: God as the Creator and Redeemer of all people
regardless of nation, gender, race, language, etc. and to distance themselves from “tribal
gods.” We can perhaps organize religiously according to group characteristics but never
with the conviction that this categorization is especially dear to God, or that God
specially keeps them and defends them. When the Catholic Church in Slovenia starts to
be equally concerned about Italians, Hungarians, Croatians, Germans as with Slovenes,
when the Islamic religious community starts to be equally concerned for Albanian and
Montenegrin Muslims as with Boshnyaks, when the Orthodox Church starts to be equally
concerned for non-Serbian Orthodox people, and then on top of them, when they all
together start being concerned for all human beings regardless of religious (and other)
affiliation, then there will be a real precondition for peace. But prior to the arrival of such
an eschatological time one could, let us say, excommunicate or at least issue a public
condemnation of those Orthodox in Banja Luka who physically attack those Muslims
who wish to rebuild the Ferhadiya Mosque, to condemn and discipline those
Herzegovinian Franciscans who make declarations against the co-existence of Croats
with non-Croats in Mostar and Herzegovina. Religious leaders both locally and wider
can begin to cooperate for mutual respect and acquaintance, ecumenism be again
supported and to expand into interreligious dialogue, and so forth. It is not enough to sign
nice proclamations. It would be better that at theological schools there are lecturers from
other faith communities. It would be better that in religious publication one could find
positive writings about others. It would be better if historians from all three groups
would work carefully and write jointly a history that could be studied in all schools, so
that there would not be completely opposite versions which will leave a permanent
parochialism of younger generalizations.
Now when more peaceful, stable and democratic times have come to almost all
former Yugoslav successor states, maybe one can expect that religious communities will
also succeed to restore balance and to direct not only their words for supporting peace,
but their actions as well. It is of great importance that in the south of the former
Yugoslavia, especially in Macedonia, there emerges interreligious support of the aims to
limit the conflicts from becoming a general civil war between Macedonians and
Albanians and that in Kosovo “ethnic cleansing” is ended.

Radić:
Religious communities should, first of all, begin to cooperate with each other and
to show much more good will toward each other. Their basic goal should certainly be the
spreading of the faith, but with respect for the differences and with maximal mutual
tolerance. When looking only at the 20th century, then the one period which I can single
out would be the 1960s when something real was accomplished in the field of mutual
rapprochement, dialogue, and ecumenism.
One can raise the question what can one expect from the religious communities. I
think they will try, first of all, to recover their positions and influence in society which
they think belongs to them. That will at first happen through attempts to return the
expropriated assets. Religious communities would seek to have a more significant
presence in education and the media, etc. The process of their rapprochement and
possible cooperation and work for peaceful developments of the Balkans, I think, does
not depend so much on themselves as on how the political, cultural, and economic
relations will develop in this territory. There are few activities that I could evaluate as
positive but I would single out those activities related to humanitarian assistance which
certain religious communities collected for refugees and for war-affected areas. Also I
could mention occasional meetings of representatives of religious communities and their
common declarations to the public. This picture is hampered by the impression of a
certain formality and external pomp without a real, internal content. At present, I do not
see a sincere desire by any of the religious communities for cooperation and
rapprochement, but I think there will be some improvements only in the future.
Zgodić:
This question can be treated by the pleading axiology of civil society. Basically,
only with the acceptance of the concept of civil society and participation in its affirmation
can religious communities usefully participate in the unfinished processes of stabilization
of peace and the building and affirmation of civilizational co-existence in the
relationships between people and nations on these territories. I can single out here only
two basic determinants of civil society.
Anti-fundamentalism is an essential standpoint of civil society. In a wider sense
civil society is contrary to the society that gathers around a transhistorical, eschatological

order of values. It is also a society contrary to the monocentric ideological society. That
society cannot exist without paternalistic, and sacralized dogma of ideology, elite,
charisma, leader, avant-garde, etc. Civil society is essentially an anti-fundamentalist
society: “the struggle for civil society means simultaneously the recognition of
complexity. Many people tend toward simplification. Even more, the greatest danger for
civil society today is fundamentalism. The assertions of religious and pseudo or parareligious groups that say we don’t need the complexities of civil society, which can
depend on simple, generally known truths, in both public and private life, are an attack on
all traditions of civil society and citizenry.”12 “Pluralism as a substantial predicate of
modern civil society can be differentiated from the paleo-liberal vision of civil society.
Pluralisms of modern societies...“13 means that in their essence there is a common
universum which is accepted unquestioningly, and other partial universa coexist in the
mode of mutual adjustments. The latter probably have some ideological functions, but
explicit conflict between ideologies have been replaced by various levels of tolerance or
even cooperation.

Ancient monopolistic pretensions to certainty, therefore became

anachronistic, although affection for traditionalism did not disappear altogether. Demonopolization of truth was promoted as an emancipatory oriented value at the expense
of old or new totalitarian aspirations. In any case, “...pluralist society does not change
only the social position of the traditional definitions of reality but even the manner of
their valuation in the consciousness of individuals.”14 Norberto Bobio also specified this
historical novum in the political context, the “ideal model of a democratic society was the
model of a centripetal society. Reality which we face is the reality of a centrifugal
society which does not have only a single center of power (Rousseau’s “general will”)
but has more of them and therefore such a society we call - and those who study politics
agree with it - polycentric or polyarchic society (or using the stronger, though not entirely
accurate expression, polycratic society).” The model worldview of polyphonic freedom is
the luxury that can and must be followed even by religious communities.
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One should work more on the affirmation of human intra-religious communities.
Believers who are subject to internal monocratism cannot be loyal in civil society to the
polytheism of worldly values. That, of course, is a substantive presupposition of the
transition to civil society and the full autonomy of religious communities.
The respect for the relevant role of religious communities in the formation of
worldviews, of the moral world and the preference for the values of civil society does not
imply, as I said, the theocratization of society. To the contrary, it implies respect for the
this worldly mission of religion, rather than getting mixed up in the chaos and
primitivism of daily pragmatism or the restoration of historically transcended models of
relationships between religion, society, and the state. No one, no matter how perfect the
legal system may be, can prevent the religious communities from deteriorating into
political banality, if they do not save themselves from political self-instrumentalization.
Theocracy is anachronistic, although every monotheistic religion, and not only Islam will,
according to its dogmatics, be not only a subjective matter but also a civil, public system
of living, including the construction of society and state. Every religion wants to
participate in the regulation of the relationship of one human being to another, the person
and politics, formulating and practicing its cosmology, anthropology, social ethics, vision
of social justice, etc. But even without old theocratic aspirations, in civil and democratic
society religious communities can satisfy their doctrinal aspirations, and freely practice
their inner religious and external social role.
In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina it is important that all religious
communities, including the Islamic Community, affirming interreligious dialogue, work
more on the emancipation of daily consciousness from prejudices toward Islam and
Muslims. Because of old prejudices toward Muslims the public is slow in liberating itself
from anachronistic stereotypes. Here is an illustration. No one is bothered by the
existence in the Christian world of aesthetic design in the hat industry for women. But
there is excitement and one speaks of frustrations and aversions when one pleads for
aesthetic design and industry of the veiling of women.
Ideology, the aggression and its effects increased the ethnic distances in the
consciousness having installed old but also new destructive religio-ethnic prejudices.
Emancipatory consciousness that is being carried by the ethos of civil society is searching

for the possibility of building civil society on the presuppositions of the amortization of
the actual impact of ethnic prejudices and their destructive consequences for the
development of civil consciousness and the formation of subjectivity of all citizens as the
decision-makers of policies and government of their nations. Therefore, it seeks the
possible emancipation of main components of programs for the gradual emancipation of
national consciousness from imprisonment in the irrational world of ethnic prejudices, in
such a way that even religious communities can make a great contribution in the building
up of civil society. In it religious communities can engage in defining the program of
general enlightenment of the new socialization of consciousness based on civic ethos and
main values of democratic society. They seek to be included in everyday activities, in the
shaping of public opinion, in programs of education, in the spirit of civil consciousness
and democratic values, in innovations in the educational process, and in general cultural
activities guided by ideas of tolerance, convergence, mental and value reintegration
between various, for now distant and closed national communities. Religious
communities should not lag behind in such engagement. In post-socialist territories and
after the aggression on B&H, a powerful return of people to religiosity took place. But
with it came also the uncontrolled vulgarization of faith. It is as if extreme
instutitionalization of religion lead to the separation of public rituals and ceremonial
practice of religious sensibilities from genuine introspective feelings of religiosity. For
the time being the external, quantitative, and ritual aspect is attractive to the religious
hierarchy. What is being ignored is that in multi-confessional societies such dazzling
external popularization produces social distances, irritates psychologically, creates
phobias, and various forms of new intolerance. On the other hand, original religiosity is
losing its origins, as Fevzija Mostarac (a Bosnian thinker of the 18th century) noted: “If
the moon of faith did not show up in the sky (of the heart), what use is prayer (itikafa) in
the harem of Kaba. Whoever knows God, he is on the path of faith; it is not important
what kind of clothing the unbeliever wears.”15 Real democratic society is pluralist.16 In
polyarchy rather than in monism, in decentralization of

life rather than in its

centralization under etatist power, in plurality of civil society rather than in the political
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homogenization of the organic state, we can recognize the epochal mega-trend. Politics
which wants to be in harmony with the core of the epoch leaves behind the political
metaphysics of a single-issue monist absolute.
Within such conceptualized civil society, religious communities can enjoy
complete autonomy. Therefore the transition of B&H society in the direction of its
reconstruction as a civil society is also of substantial interest to the religious
communities. Within civil society and the religious community one should consistently
accept the universal principle of separation of church and state. Within the autonomy of
civil society religious communities should enjoy full freedom. It presupposes respect and
affirmation of the public function of religious communities in the formation of values in
the orientation of citizens. But in the context of the polyphonic autonomy of civil society,
social promotion, the arrangement of social roles, participation in political power, and
availability of public jobs must be achievable for all citizens regardless of their
worldview, or religious affiliation. Civil society further pleads, in my opinion, for a
conflict-less convergent relationships with religious communities. But this civil society
wants freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of expression of so-called
sociological types of believers, which means believers who do not want to practice their
religion behind closed shutters, to practice their religion in anonymity, which in public
life is illegal, and is therefore forced to be conspiratorial, with a frustrating fear that their
religion will prevent their access to public positions. Of course, in B&H society a system
of state religions, or the system of recognized religions, or the system of the atheist state
cannot function. These are the very systems that people want to practice in some areas of
ex-Yugoslavia. The system of state religion is specifically installed in the Serbian entity
in B&H. Theoretically, conceptually, and politically the religious communities should
appeal to the constitution of the state as a worldly and democratic state based on civil
society.
A system of privileged religion cannot exist; before the law and the state all
religions must be equal. Emancipatory thinking favors the equality of all religions and
religious communities and wholeheartedly supports the establishment of interreligious
dialogue in B&H, which is institutionalized and its discussions are regularly publicized in
the media and publications. To emphasize, on the path of the of critical demystification of

such parasitical symbiosis, religion is eternal while political parties are temporary;
sometimes in power, sometimes not. Religion is universal, while the party is particular,
religion is self-less, while the party is the beehive of profane interest, faith is gathered
around the Holy, while the party is around the Vulgar, faith is theology while the party is
ideology. Therefore religious communities must seek not to contaminate themselves with
profane things of temporary passions and political struggles. In this axiological horizon
they should recognize the space of new freedoms.
On this path there are several obstacles. We will point out but a few. First of all,
not only fanaticized religious hierarchy but even secular intelligentsia strengthens
antagonisms imbuing the civil consciousness of every-day religiosity with hatred and
fanaticism. An example is B. Jevtić from Belgrade whose books are a textbook case of
crazed anti-Islamism. Thus it is not a question of a secular intelligentsia that would
promote militant atheism but an intelligentsia that preaches anti-Christianity or antiIslamism as alleged experts. Therefore this type of expertise must be exposed within a
critical circle of emancipatory consciousness and critical democratic political culture.
Further, it is necessary to critique the conventional dogmatic schemas, sometimes
aggressively publicized by the religious hierarchy which separates people exclusively
into theists and atheists. What, if anything, is there between these two extremes? Can’t
people be animists or polytheists? Can’ they be as Giordano Bruno, pantheists, can’t they
like Albert Einstein be deists, can’t they in a Christian or Islamic sea also be Buddhists,
can’t they be mystics, agnostics, skeptics or similar? I want to say that if religious
communities will not nurture tolerance in the spirit of a civil polytheism of loyalty, and
instead of the old totalitarian atheism enforce a monocratic monotheism then they will
inhibit the contradictory processes of the building of civil society and the society of
interests of religious communities. But this will also have negative implications on
interreligious dialogue and interreligious tolerance by which religious communities
should have a more substantive and effective engagement in this area..
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